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11 Introduction
In many examples of the monopolist’s selling problem (optimal auctions),1 the seller has
considerable control over the accuracy of the buyers’ information concerning their own
valuations. Very often, the seller can decide whether the buyers can access information
that reﬁnes their valuations; however, she either cannot observe these signals, or at
least, she is unaware of their signiﬁcance to the buyers. For example, the seller of an
oil ﬁeld or a painting can determine the number and nature of the tests the buyers can
carry out privately (without the seller observing the results). Another example (due
to Bergemann and Pesendorfer, 2002) is where the seller of a company has detailed
information regarding the company’s assets (e.g., its client list), but does not know
how well these assets complement the assets of the potential buyers. Here, the seller
can choose the extent to which she will disclose information about the ﬁrm’s assets
to the buyers. Sometimes, the buyers’ valuations become naturally more precise over
time as the uncertainty of the good’s value resolves, and the seller can decide how long
to wait with the sale.
When the buyers’ information acquisition is controlled by the seller, that process
can also be optimized by the mechanism designer. In this paper, we explore the revenue
maximizing mechanism for the sale of an indivisible good in a model where the buyers
initially only have an estimate of their private valuations. The valuation estimates
are reﬁned by signals (added to the initial estimates) that the seller can costlessly
release but cannot directly observe. This model captures the common theme of the
motivating examples: the seller controls, although cannot learn, private information
that the buyers care about.
Our main result is that in the revenue-maximizing mechanism, the seller will allow
the buyers to learn their valuations as precisely as possible, and that her expected
revenue will be as high as if she could observe the additional signals.2 That is, the
buyers will not enjoy additional informational rents from learning their valuations
more accurately when the access to additional information is controlled by the seller.
Besides these surprising ﬁndings, an added theoretical interest of our model is that the
1Early seminal contributions include Myerson (1981), Harris and Raviv (1981), Riley and Samuel-
son (1981), and Maskin and Riley (1984).
2In this hypothetical situation the buyers may or may not observe (but in either case can ex post
verify) the additional signals.
2standard revelation principle cannot be applied, yet we are able to characterize the
optimal mechanism.
We also exhibit a simple mechanism, dubbed the handicap auction,w h i c hi m p l e -
ments the revenue-maximizing outcome. This auction consists of two rounds. In the
ﬁrst round, each buyer buys a price premium from a menu provided by the seller (a
smaller premium costs more). Then the seller releases, without observing, as much
information as she can. In the second round, the buyers bid in a second-price auction,
where the winner is required to pay his premium over the second highest non-negative
bid. We call the whole mechanism a handicap auction because buyers compete under
unequal conditions in the second round: a bidder with a smaller premium has a clear
advantage.3
For a single buyer, the handicap auction simpliﬁes to a menu of buy-options (a
schedule consisting of option fees as a function of the strike price), where the buyer
gets to observe the additional signal after paying for the option of his choice.
Our model also nests the classical (independent private values) auction design prob-
lem as a special case, where the additional signals are identically zero. In this case, the
handicap auction implements the outcome of the optimal auction of Myerson (1981)
and Riley and Samuelson (1981).
Several papers have studied issues related to how buyers learn their valuations in
auctions, and what consequences that bears on the seller’s revenue, both from a positive
and a normative point of view. One strand of the literature, see Persico (2000), Compte
and Jehiel (2001) and the references therein, focuses on the buyers’ incentives to acquire
information in diﬀerent auction formats. Our approach is diﬀe r e n ti nt h a tw ew a n tt o
design a revenue-maximizing mechanism in which the seller has the opportunity to
costlessly release (without observing) information to the buyers. In our model, it is
the seller (not the buyers) who controls how much information the buyers acquire.
Information disclosure by the seller has been studied in the context of the winner’s
curse and the linkage principle by Milgrom and Weber (1982). They investigate whether
in traditional auctions the seller should commit to disclose public signals that are
aﬃliated with the buyers’ valuations. They ﬁnd that the seller gains from committing to
3The handicap auction can also be implemented as a mechanism where, in the ﬁrst round, each
bidder buys a discount (larger discounts cost more), and then participates in a second price auction
with a positive reservation price, where the winner’s discount is applied towards his payment.
3full disclosure, because that reduces the buyers’ fear of overbidding, thereby increasing
their bids and hence the seller’s revenue. Our problem diﬀers from this classic one in
many aspects. Most importantly, in our setting, the signals that the seller can release
are private (not public) signals, in the sense that each signal aﬀects the valuation of
a single buyer and can be disclosed to that buyer only. The seller will gain from the
release of information (which she does not even observe) not because of the linkage
principle, but because the information can potentially improve eﬃciency, and she can
charge for the access.
Our motivation is closer to that of Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2002). They con-
sider the task of designing an information disclosure policy for the seller that allows to
extract the most revenue in a subsequent auction. Their problem is very diﬀerent from
ours in that the seller is not allowed to charge for the release of information. Their
model also diﬀers from ours in that the buyers do not have private information at the
beginning of the game. Under these assumptions, Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2002)
show that the information structure that allows the seller to design the auction with
the largest expected revenue is necessarily imperfect: in this structure, buyers are only
allowed to learn which element of a ﬁnite partition their valuation falls into.
In contrast, in our paper, we design the expected revenue maximizing mechanism
where the information structure and the rules of transaction together are chosen op-
timally. The diﬀerence may ﬁrst seem subtle, it is important nevertheless. What we
assume is that the seller can integrate the rules of information acquisition into the
mechanism used for the sale itself. For example, in our model, the seller can charge
the buyers for getting more and more accurate signals (perhaps in several rounds); the
buyers could even be asked to bid for obtaining more information.
The idea that “selling” the access to information may be advantageous for the seller
can be easily illustrated by an example. Suppose that there are two buyers who are
both unaware of their valuation (drawn independently from the same distribution),
which the seller can allow them to learn. Then consider the following mechanism. The
seller charges both buyers an entry fee, which equals half of the expected diﬀerence of
the maximum and minimum of two independent draws of the value-distribution. In
exchange, she allows the buyers to observe their valuations (after they have paid the
entry fee), and makes them play an ordinary second-price auction. The second-price
auction will be eﬃcient, and the buyers’ ex-ante expected proﬁt exactly equals the
4upfront entry fee. The seller ends up appropriating the entire surplus by charging the
buyers for observing their valuations.4
This simple solution – the seller committing to the eﬃcient allocation, revealing
the additional signals, and charging an entry fee equal to the expected eﬃciency gains
– only works when the buyers do not have private information to start with. Otherwise
(for example, if the buyers privately observe signals, but their valuations also depend
on other signals that they may see at the seller’s discretion), the auctioneer, as we
will show, does not want to commit to an eﬃcient auction in the continuation, so the
previously proposed mechanism does not work. We have to ﬁnd a more sophisticated
auction, and this is exactly what we will do in the remainder of the paper.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we outline the model and
introduce the necessary notation. In Section 3, we ﬁrst derive the revenue maximizing
auction for the case when the seller can observe the additional signals that reﬁne the
buyers’ valuations. Then, we show that the same allocation and expected revenue can
also be attained by a handicap auction, even if the seller cannot directly observe the
additional signals. The results are illustrated by a numerical example. We conclude
and remark on extensions in Section 4.
2T h e M o d e l
Assume that there are n potential buyers for an indivisible good. The seller’s valuation
for the good is zero. The valuation of buyer i ∈ {1,...,n} is the sum of two random
variables, vi (called “type”) and si (called “shock”), which are distributed indepen-
dently (of each other and across i) according to cumulative distribution functions Fi
and Gi, respectively.5 We assume that the support of Fi is [0,1], on which fi = F0
i
exists, and that this distribution exhibits a monotone hazard rate, that is, (1 − Fi)/fi
is weakly decreasing on [0,1]. We also assume that the distribution of the shocks is
atomless, however, we do not make any restriction on the support of the Gi’s. We will
use v to denote the vector of types and s to denote the vector of shocks. We will also
4T h i se x a m p l e( w h e nt h eb u y e r sh a v en oi n i t i a lp r i v ate information) has been studied independently
by Gershkov (2002), who also obtained the same result.
5The reader may ﬁnd it helpful to think of the shock as a noise with zero mean, so the buyer’s
type is his expected valuation for the good. However, we will not make this assumption in the formal
model.
5use the usual shorthand notation for the vector of types of buyers other than i, v−i,
and let s−i denote (sj)j6=i.
The realization of vi is observed by buyer i. Although neither the seller nor buyer i
can directly observe the shock, the seller has the ability to generate signals conditional
on s, which only buyer i will observe. In particular, we assume that the seller can allow
buyer i to observe his shock, si, without the seller learning its value.6
All parties are risk neutral. The seller’s objective is to maximize her (expected)
revenue. Buyer i’s utility is the negative of his payment to the seller, plus, in case he
wins, the value of the object, vi+si. Every buyer i has an outside option of zero utility.
The seller can design any (indirect) mechanism, which can consist of several rounds
of communication between the parties (i.e., sending of messages according to rules
speciﬁed by the seller). The seller can also release signals (without observing them).
Transfers of the good and money may also occur as a function of the history. The
set of all indirect mechanisms is rather complex, and the standard revelation principle
cannot be applied. However, this issue is avoided by the approach that we take in the
next section.
3R e s u l t s
Our main result is the characterization of the expected revenue maximizing mechanism
in the model introduced in Section 2. We will show that an optimal mechanism exists,
which can be practically implemented as a “handicap auction” (for a description, see
the Introduction or Subsection 3.2 below). We will also show that this mechanism
achieves the same expected revenue as if the seller could observe the realizations of
the shocks. In other words, while the buyers still enjoy information rents from their
types, all their rents from observing the shocks can be appropriated by the seller.
In Subsection 3.1, we start with the derivation of the optimal mechanism when the
seller can observe the shocks (while the buyers cannot) after having committed to an
indirect mechanism. In Subsection 3.2, we show that in our model, the same expected
revenue can also be generated by the seller without observing the shocks.
6In many applications, the seller may not be able to generate just any random signal correlated
with s. Therefore, all we assume is that the seller can “show” si to buyer i if she so decides.
63.1 The Optimal Mechanism When the Seller
Can Observe the Shocks
Let us assume, in this subsection only, that the seller alone can observe (and verify to a
third party) the realizations of the shocks after having committed to an indirect mech-
anism. The Revelation Principle applies, hence we can restrict our attention to mecha-
nisms where the buyers report their types, and the seller determines the allocation and
transfers as a function of the types and the shocks. We will analyze truthful equilibria
of direct mechanisms that consist of an allocation rule, xi(vi,v −i,s i,s −i) for all i,a n d
an (expected) transfer scheme, ti(vi,v −i,s i,s −i) for all i.H e r e ,xi(vi,v −i,s i,s −i) is the
probability that buyer i receives the good, and ti(vi,v −i,s i,s −i) is the transfer that he
expects to pay, given the reported types and the realization of the shocks.
We will use the tools of Bayesian mechanism design to ﬁnd the optimal (expected
revenue maximizing) auction. The result will provide an upper bound on the expected
revenue the seller can achieve in the case when she cannot observe the shocks directly,
which is going to be the subject of Subsection 3.2.
If buyer i with type vi reports type ˆ vi then his expected payoﬀ will be
πi(vi, ˆ vi)=Ev−i,s[xi(ˆ vi,v −i,s i,s −i)(vi + si) − ti(ˆ vi,v −i,s i,s −i)], (1)
where E stands for expectation. Let Xi(vi)=Ev−i,s[xi(vi,v −i,s i,s −i)], and introduce
Πi(vi)=πi(vi,v i) for the indirect proﬁt function. Then, (1) can be rewritten as
πi(vi, ˆ vi)=Ev−i,s [xi(ˆ vi,v −i,s i,s −i)(ˆ vi + si + vi − ˆ vi) − ti(ˆ vi,v −i,s i,s −i)] (2)
= Πi(ˆ vi)+( vi − ˆ vi)Xi(ˆ vi).
Incentive compatibility of the mechanism means that, for all vi, ˆ vi ∈ [0,1],w eh a v e
πi(vi,v i) ≥ πi(vi, ˆ vi), that is, (1) is maximized in ˆ vi at ˆ vi = vi. Using (2), we can
rewrite incentive compatibility as
Πi(vi) − Πi(ˆ vi) ≥ (vi − ˆ vi)Xi(ˆ vi), ∀vi, ˆ vi ∈ [0,1],a n di =1 ,...,n.( 3 )
In the following Lemma, we apply standard arguments (see Myerson, 1981) for char-
acterizing incentive compatible mechanisms.
7Lemma 1 Assume that, after having committed to a selling mechanism, the seller can
observe the realizations of the shocks. A direct mechanism is incentive compatible if





Proof. By (3) and its counterpart where the roles of vi and ˆ vi are reversed,
(vi − ˆ vi)Xi(ˆ vi) ≤ Πi(vi) − Πi(ˆ vi) ≤ (vi − ˆ vi)Xi(vi).
This inequality implies that Xi is weakly increasing and therefore is integrable, and so
equation (4) follows.
Now we prove that equation (4) and Xi weakly increasing are suﬃcient for incentive






ˆ vi Xi(ˆ vi)dν = Πi(ˆ vi)+( vi − ˆ vi)Xi(ˆ vi),




≥ Πi(ˆ vi) −
R ˆ vi
vi Xi(ˆ vi)dν = Πi(ˆ vi)+( vi − ˆ vi)Xi(ˆ vi).
This establishes that (3) holds.
Now we turn to the problem of determining the revenue-maximizing mechanism.
Using (4), we can write the expectation (over all types) of buyer i’s surplus as
Z 1
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= Πi(0) + Ev,s
·





8On the second line, we applied Fubini’s Theorem. On the third line, we substituted
1 − Fi(ν) for
R 1
ν fi(vi)dvi. Finally, we plugged in the deﬁnition of Xi.
The seller’s expected revenue equals the diﬀerence between the expected social















The mechanism design problem is to maximize (5) by choosing the integration
constants and the vector of trade probabilities subject to the incentive compatibility
constraints. That is, by Lemma 1, the problem is to choose for all i, Πi(0) and for
all i and (vi,v −i,s i,s −i), xi(vi,v −i,s i,s −i),s ot h a tXi is weakly increasing and (5) is
maximized. The following proposition characterizes the solution to this problem.
Proposition 1 Assume that, after having committed to a selling mechanism, the seller
can observe the realizations of the shocks. In the expected revenue maximizing mecha-
nism, Πi(0) = 0, and the allocation rule is,
xi(vi,v −i,s i,s −i)=
(
































In other words, the seller sets the allocation rule so that the buyer with the largest
non-negative shock-adjusted virtual valuation, vj+sj−(1−Fj(vj))/fj(vj), will win. The
transfers, and therefore the seller’s proﬁt, are determined by the incentive compatibility
constraints. The proof (below) is standard.
Proof. The proposed allocation rule, (6), together with Πi(0) = 0 for all i,p o i n t -
9wise maximizes (5). We will prove that it can be made incentive compatible using an
appropriately chosen transfer scheme.
By assumption, (1−Fi(vi))/fi(vi) is decreasing, therefore the shock-adjusted virtual
valuation function, vi + si − (1 − Fi(vi))/fi(vi),i si n c r e a s i n gi nvi.T h i si m p l i e st h a t
for all i, v−i, si,a n ds−i, xi(vi,v −i,s i,s −i) ≥ xi(ˆ vi,v −i,s i,s −i) if and only if vi ≥ ˆ vi,
and, after taking expectation with respect to v−i and s, Xi(vi) ≥ Xi(ˆ vi) if and only if
vi ≥ ˆ vi.T h a ti s ,Xi is weakly increasing.
It remains to show that there exists a transfer scheme such that (4) holds, Πi(0) = 0,
and all types of all buyers participate. Recall that in a mechanism with allocation rule
xi and transfer scheme ti, the expected proﬁt of buyer i with type vi is
Πi(vi)=Ev−i,s [(vi + si)xi(vi,v −i,s i,s −i)] − Ev−i,s[ti(vi,v −i,s i,s −i)].
Using xi given in (6), deﬁne buyer i’s transfer as
ti(vi,v −i,s i,s −i)=
Z vi
0
Xi(ν)dν − E˜ v−i,˜ s [(vi +˜ si)xi(vi, ˜ v−i, ˜ si, ˜ s−i)],
where Xi(vi)=E˜ v−i,˜ s[xi(vi, ˜ v−i, ˜ si, ˜ s−i)]. Observe that (4) holds, and Πi(0) = 0.
Finally, all buyers participate because their outside option is zero by assumption,
Πi(0) = 0,a n dΠi is increasing.
Remark 1 It is clear from the proof that the claim of Proposition 1 remains true
even if the monotone hazard rate assumption is violated, but the virtual valuations are
weakly increasing, that is, if vi − (1 − Fi(vi))/fi(vi) is weakly increasing in vi for all i.
In the next subsection we show that the same outcome can also be implemented by
the seller even if she cannot observe the shocks, as long as she can allow the buyers to
observe them.
3.2 The Optimal Mechanism When the Seller
Cannot Observe the Shocks: The Handicap Auction
Assume that the seller cannot directly observe the shocks, but she can allow the buyers
to learn them. Clearly, in this case, the seller cannot do better than under the assump-
tions of Subsection 3.1 (where she could observe the shocks after having committed to
10a mechanism). The main result of the present subsection is that we exhibit a mecha-
nism, called the “handicap auction,” which implements the same allocation (with the
same expected revenue) as the revenue maximizing mechanism of Subsection 3.1.
In general, a handicap auction consists of two rounds. In the ﬁrst round, each
buyer i, knowing his type, chooses a price premium pi for a fee Ci(pi),w h e r eCi is a
fee-schedule published by the seller. The buyers do not observe the premia chosen by
others. The second round is a traditional auction, and the winner is required to pay
his premium over the price. Between the two rounds, the seller may send messages to
the buyers. In our model, the seller will allow every buyer to learn the realization of
his shock between the two rounds, and the second round is a second price (or English)
auction with a zero reservation price.
We call this mechanism a handicap auction because in the second round, the buy-
ers compete under unequal conditions: a bidder with a smaller premium has a clear
advantage. An interesting feature of our auction is that the bidders buy their premium
in the initial round, which allows for some form of price discrimination. We will come
back to the issue of price discrimination in Subsection 3.3.
An interesting alternative way of formulating the rules of the handicap auction
would be by using price discounts (or rebates) instead of price premia. In this version,
each bidder ﬁrst has to buy a discount from a schedule published by the seller. Then
the buyers are allowed to learn the realizations of the shocks, and are invited to bid
in a second price auction with a reservation price r, where the winner’s discount is
applied towards his payment. The reader can check that a handicap auction can be
easily transformed into a mechanism like this by setting r suﬃciently high (larger than
the highest pi in the original fee-schedules), and specifying that a discount di = r − pi
is sold for a price C(pi) in the ﬁrst round. In what follows, however, we will use the
original form of the handicap auction.
If there is only a single buyer, then the handicap auction simpliﬁes to a menu of
buy options: pi c a nb et h o u g h to fa st h es t r i k ep r i c e ,a n dt h eu p f r o n tf e e ,Ci(pi),i s
the cost of the option. In the second round, the buyer can exercise his option to buy
at price pi (there is no other bidder, so the second-highest bid is zero), for which he
initially paid a fee of Ci(pi). We will revisit the single-buyer case later in the context
of a numerical example.
First, we state what happens in the second round of the handicap auction.
11Lemma 2 In the second round of the handicap auction (after each buyer learns the
realization of his shock), it is a weakly dominant strategy for buyer i with price premium
pi to bid bi = vi + si − pi.
Proof. The second round is a second-price auction where buyer i knows that when
he wins, he pays the second highest non-negative bid plus his own premium pi.I fh e
submits a bid ˆ bi >v i + si − pi instead of bi, then the only occasion when this bid
makes a diﬀerence is when he wins with ˆ bi (which is therefore non-negative) and the
second highest bid (or zero, whichever is larger), bj, is between bi and ˆ bi.H i sp r o ﬁti s
vi + si − bj − pi <v i + si − bi − pi =0 ,s oh ee n d su pw o r s eo ﬀ.As i m i l a ra r g u m e n t
shows that i can only miss proﬁtable opportunities by bidding ˆ bi <b i.T h e r e f o r e
bidding bi = vi + si − pi is indeed a weakly dominant strategy.
From now on, we assume that the buyers follow their weakly dominant strategies in
the second round. Then the handicap auction can be represented by pairs of functions,
pi :[ 0 ,1] → R and ci :[ 0 ,1] → R,f o ri =1 ,...,n,w h e r epi(vi) is the price premium
that type vi ∈ [0,1] chooses (in equilibrium) for the fee of ci(vi) ≡ Ci(pi(vi)).I nw h a t
follows, let wj = vj + sj − pj(vj),i n t r o d u c ea na r t i ﬁcial buyer numbered j =0with
w0 =0 , and denote maxj6=i{wj,0} by wmax
−i .
Incentive compatibility of the handicap auction {ci,p i}n
i=1 means that type vi does
not want to deviate and choose pi(ˆ vi) for fee ci(ˆ vi) in the ﬁrst round. If he deviates,
t h e nb yL e m m a2 ,h ew i l lb i dvi + si − pi(ˆ vi) in the second round. Therefore, if buyer
i with type vi pretends to have ˆ vi in the ﬁrst round while the other buyers behave










− ci(ˆ vi). (8)
Incentive compatibility of the mechanism means that vi maximizes π∗
i(vi, ˆ vi) in ˆ vi.L e t
Π∗
i(vi)=π∗







the expected probability that type vi wins the second round after having chosen pre-
mium pi(ˆ vi) in the ﬁrst round, given that all other bidders behave truthfully.
12Lemma 3 A handicap auction {ci,p i}n
i=1 is incentive compatible if and only if, for all









and for all v0
i,v00
i ∈ [0,1] such that v0




i) ≤ Qi(vi,v i) ≤ Qi(vi,v
00
i ). (11)
Condition (11) states that a buyer with a given type is weakly more (less) likely to
get the good in equilibrium than he would be by imitating a lower (higher) type in the
ﬁrst round. Essentially, this means that lower types should get higher premia in any
incentive compatible handicap auction. More precisely, if pi is weakly decreasing for
all i then (11) holds, and the converse is true if the density of si has full support on
(−∞,+∞).
Proof. [Necessity] We ﬁrst prove that incentive compatibility of the handicap
auction implies (10) and (11). Incentive compatibility is equivalent to,
for all i and ˆ vi <v i, π
∗
i(vi, ˆ vi) ≤ π
∗
i(vi,v i) and π
∗
i(ˆ vi,v i) ≤ π
∗
i(ˆ vi,ˆ vi). (12)










































i(vi) − Qi(vi,v i)(vi − ˆ vi) − ∆i(ˆ vi,v i).
Given this, incentive compatibility of the handicap auction, (12), is equivalent to,
for all i and ˆ vi <v i,
Qi(ˆ vi, ˆ vi)+
∆i(vi, ˆ vi)





vi − ˆ vi
≤ Qi(vi,v i)+
∆i(ˆ vi,v i)
vi − ˆ vi
.
Note that ∆i(x,y) ≥ 0 if and only if x ≥ y, therefore ∆i(ˆ vi,v i) ≤ 0 ≤ ∆i(vi, ˆ vi). Hence,
incentive compatibility implies




vi − ˆ vi
≤ Qi(vi,v i). (13)
From this, Qi(ν,ν) is monotone weakly increasing in ν, hence it is integrable, and so
(10) follows.
N e x t ,w es h o wt h a t( 1 1 )m u s th o l d . A s s u m et h a tˆ vi <v i.I f pi(ˆ vi) ≥ pi(vi) then





















































= πi(ˆ vi, ˆ vi) − Qi(ˆ vi, ˆ vi)(pi(vi) − pi(ˆ vi)) + ci(ˆ vi) − ci(vi) − εi(ˆ vi,v i).
14By incentive compatibility, (12), πi(vi, ˆ vi) − πi(vi,v i) ≤ 0 ≤ πi(ˆ vi, ˆ vi) − πi(ˆ vi,v i).
By (14) and (15), this is equivalent to
Qi(vi,v i)(pi(vi) − pi(ˆ vi)) + εi(vi, ˆ vi) ≤ ci(ˆ vi) − ci(vi)
≤ Qi(ˆ vi, ˆ vi)(pi(vi) − pi(ˆ vi)) + εi(ˆ vi,v i). (16)
Observe that since ˆ vi <v i and pi(ˆ vi) <p i(vi),w eh a v eεi(ˆ vi,v i) ≤ 0 ≤ εi(vi, ˆ vi).T h e n ,
εi(vi, ˆ vi)=εi(ˆ vi,v i)=0 , otherwise (16) implies Qi(vi,v i) <Q i(ˆ vi, ˆ vi) contradicting







which is equivalent to Qi(vi, ˆ vi)=Qi(vi,v i).T h e r e f o r e , ˆ vi <v i implies Qi(vi, ˆ vi) ≤
Qi(vi,v i),n om a t t e rw h e t h e ro rn o tpi(vi) ≤ pi(ˆ vi),a n dt h eﬁrst inequality of (11)






Qi(ˆ vi,ˆ vi)=Qi(ˆ vi,v i). Therefore, ˆ vi <v i implies Qi(ˆ vi,ˆ vi) ≤ Qi(ˆ vi,v i),t h a ti s ,t h e
second inequality of (11) holds.
[Suﬃciency] We now show that (10) and (11) imply that the handicap auction
is incentive compatible. Let Ui(vi,s i) be the expected equilibrium proﬁto ft y p evi
with shock si in the second stage. Clearly, Π∗
i(vi) ≡ Esi [Ui(vi,s i)] − ci(vi).F r o mt h e
incentive compatibility of the second round it routinely follows (see also equation 4 and
the proof of Lemma 1) that, for all si ≤ ˆ si,














is the probability that, in equilibrium, type vi ob-
serving shock si wins the second round.
By Lemma 2, buyer i with type vi who pretends to have type ˆ vi in the ﬁrst stage
and observes si before the second stage will bid bi = vi+si−pi(ˆ vi) in the second stage,
“as if” he had type ˆ vi and observed si+vi−ˆ vi. His probability of winning and expected
p a y m e n tw i l lb et h es a m ea si fh eh a dat y p e - s h o c kp a i r(ˆ vi,s i + vi − ˆ vi). Hence, his
expected proﬁt in the second round will be Ui(ˆ vi,s i + vi − ˆ vi).
15This noted, we can rewrite π∗
i(vi, ˆ vi),w i t hˆ vi <v i,a s
π
∗
i(vi,ˆ vi)=Esi [Ui(ˆ vi,s i + vi − ˆ vi)] − ci(ˆ vi)






































Incentive compatibility of the handicap auction now becomes, for all i, ˆ vi ∈ [0,1),a n d
vi ∈ (ˆ vi,1],
Z vi−ˆ vi
0







Qi(vi + y,vi)dy. (17)
From condition (11), Qi(ˆ vi+x, ˆ vi) ≤ Qi(ˆ vi+x, ˆ vi+x) for x ∈ [0,v i−ˆ vi].T h e r e f o r e
Z vi−ˆ vi
0
Qi(ˆ vi + x, ˆ vi)dx ≤
Z vi−ˆ vi
0





so the ﬁrst inequality of (17) holds. From (11), Qi(vi + y,vi + y) ≤ Qi(vi + y,vi) for












and the second inequality of (17) holds, too. Therefore, the handicap auction is incen-
tive compatible.
In Lemma 1, we characterized incentive compatible mechanisms under the assump-
tion that the seller can observe the shocks, while in Lemma 3, we characterized incentive
compatible handicap auctions for the case when she cannot. Note that the necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for incentive compatibility (in particular, the monotonicity
conditions on Xi and Qi, respectively) are not the same in the two cases. We will
16comment on the consequences of this fact in the next subsection.
Lemma 3 can be used to derive the handicap auction that maximizes the objective
of the mechanism designer. In particular, we can easily determine the expected revenue
maximizing handicap auction. In the next proposition we do just that; moreover, we
claim that this handicap auction achieves the same expected revenue as if the seller
could observe the realization of the shocks.
Proposition 2 Assume that the seller cannot observe the realizations of the shocks,
although she can allow the buyers to observe them. The seller can implement allocation
rule (6) with expected revenue (7) via a handicap auction {ci,p i}n





and ci(vi) is deﬁned by
ci(vi)=Ev−i,s
·












Proof. If, for all j =1 ,...,n and vj ∈ [0,1],t y p evj of buyer j purchases a price
premium pj(vj)=( 1− Fj(vj))/fj(vj) in the ﬁrst round, then buyer i w i l lw i ni nt h e
second round if and only if, for all j,











This is so because in the second round, every buyer j bids vj + sj − pj(vj). Hence the
allocation rule is indeed the same as (6), provided that all buyers behave “truthfully,”
i.e., every buyer j with type vj chooses pj(vj) for a fee cj(vj) deﬁned in (19).
We can easily check that the handicap auction deﬁned by (18) and (19) satisﬁes the
hypotheses of Lemma 3. First, pi is weakly decreasing by the assumption of monotone










17Also note that Π∗
i(0) = 0 for all i. By Lemma 3, (18) and (19) deﬁne an incentive
compatible handicap auction.
It remains to show that the seller’s expected revenue in this handicap auction is
equal to that in the optimal mechanism of Proposition 1 (where the seller could observe
t h es h o c k s ) .N o t et h a tt h ee x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ of buyer i with type vi in the mechanism
of Proposition 1 is given by (4) with allocation rule (6) and Πi(0) = 0. The expected
payoﬀ of buyer i with type vi in the proposed handicap auction is given by (10) with
premium schedule (18) and Π∗
i(0) = 0.T h e r e f o r e ,Πi(vi)=Π∗
i(vi) for all vi.S i n c et h e
allocation rules in the two mechanisms coincide, the total social surplus is the same in
both cases. The seller’s expected revenue is just the diﬀerence of the total surplus and
the buyers’ payoﬀ, therefore, it must also be the same.
Remark 2 If the support of each shock is (−∞,+∞) then, as we remarked before
the proof of Lemma 3, pi must be weakly decreasing for the handicap auction to be
incentive compatible. Also observe that the optimal allocation rule in Proposition 1
is unique (i.e., allocate the good to the buyer with the highest non-negative shock-
adjusted virtual valuation). Therefore, if the seller can achieve the same revenue in a
handicap auction without observing the shocks, then the allocation rule must be the
same. Hence, the premium in this handicap auction must equal the hazard rate, (18),
and the monotone hazard rate assumption is necessary to guarantee the same revenue.
3.3 Discussion
From the seller’s perspective, the premium—fee schedule oﬀered in the ﬁrst round of the
handicap auction works as a device to discriminate among buyers with diﬀerent value
estimates. When a buyer decides to participate in the handicap auction, he knows his
type (expected valuation), which tells him whether he is more or less likely to win.
Therefore, in the ﬁrst round, a buyer with a high type chooses a small price premium
for a large fee in order not to pay much when he wins. Using analogous reasoning, low
types choose large price premia, which are cheaper, but make winning more expensive.
It is interesting to observe that in the optimal handicap auction, two buyers with the
same actual valuation (same vi+si) do not have the same probability of winning. The
buyer with the larger vi will choose a smaller price premium, bid higher in the second
round, and will be more likely to win. This shows that the auction does not achieve
18full ex post eﬃciency, even under ex ante symmetry of the bidders and conditional on
the object being sold.7
In order to better explain our main result (Proposition 2), consider a setup where
the buyers are ex ante symmetric (the vi’s are identically distributed), and the shocks
are mean zero random variables. Let us compare the optimal allocation rule in the case
when the seller can observe the shocks (as in Subsection 3.1) with that of the revenue
maximizing auction when nobody (neither the seller nor the buyers) can observe them.
In the latter case, the seller should allocate the good to the buyer with the largest
non-negative virtual value-estimate, vi − (1 − F(vi))/f(vi). If the seller can observe
the shocks, then, in the optimal mechanism, the good will be allocated more eﬃciently,
as the winner will now be the buyer with the highest non-negative shock-adjusted
virtual valuation, vi +si −(1−F(vi))/f(vi), according to equation (6).8 According to
Proposition 2, the seller, by controlling the release of the shocks and without actually
observing them, can implement the same allocation, and surprisingly, can appropriate
t h ei n c r e a s ei ne ﬃciency.9
One may suggest that the way the seller can appropriate all rents from the addi-
tional information is that in the handicap auction, she essentially charges the buyers
a type-dependent up-front fee equal to the “value” of the information they are about
to receive. This intuition may be appealing, but it overly simpliﬁes the workings of
the mechanism. First, the value of the additional information to the participants is
not well-deﬁned because it depends on the rules of the selling mechanism. This value
could be diﬀerent if the seller chose a mechanism diﬀerent from the handicap auction.
A n o t h e ra r g u m e n ti st h a tw es h o w e d ,t h es e l l e rm a yn o ta l w a y sb ea b l et oe x t r a c t
all rents for the additional information via a handicap auction. This is so if the vir-
tual value-estimates are monotone increasing, but the type-distributions do not exhibit
7In contrast, in the classical setup with deterministic valuations, the optimal auction of Myerson
(1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) is eﬃcient conditional on sale, provided that the buyers are
ex ante symmetric.
8It is easy to see that if vi −(1−F(vi))/f(vi) <v j −(1−F(vj))/f(vj), but, by adding the shocks
to both sides the inequality is reversed, then vi + si >v j + sj. Therefore, an allocation based on the
shock-adjusted virtual valuations “pointwise” improves eﬃciency. (This may not be true if the Fi’s
are not identical.)
9If the buyers’ ex ante type-distributions are not identical then, as the seller gets to observe the
signals, the eﬃciency of the optimal mechanism may only improve in ex ante expectation. Still, there
will be some eﬃciency gain, which will be fully extracted by the seller even if she cannot observe the
additional signals.
19monotone hazard rates (compare Remarks 1 and 2). The allocation rule in the optimal
mechanism when the seller can observe the shocks will be based on the shock-adjusted
virtual value-estimates, but the corresponding premium functions, the pi’s, would not
be weakly decreasing. Therefore, the former allocation rule is not implementable via a
handicap auction when the seller cannot observe the shocks.
3.4 Determining the Optimal Handicap Auction:
AN u m e r i c a lE x a m p l e
It may be useful to compute a numerical example not only for illustrative purposes,
but also, to see how a seller may be able to compute the parameters of the optimal
handicap auction (the price premium—fee schedule) in a practical application.
The optimal pi(vi) is given by (18), and ci(vi) is given by (19). Supposing that pi
is diﬀerentiable, we can rewrite (19) as
ci(0) = Ev−i,s
·













wj − vi + pi(vi)]
¸
. (21)
Note that (21) is just the ﬁrst-order condition of vi ∈ argmaxˆ vi π∗
i(vi, ˆ vi),w h e r e
π∗
i(vi, ˆ vi) is given by (8).
We will consider the following setup. The types are distributed independently
and uniformly on [0,1], and the shocks are distributed independently according to a
standard logistic distribution.10
First, assume that there is a single buyer, that is, n =1 . As we mentioned it earlier,
the handicap auction with a single buyer can be thought of as a menu of buy options,
represented by C1(p1),w h e r ep1 is the strike price and C1(p1) is the fee of the option.
In the ﬁrst round, the buyer chooses a price p1 and pays C1(p1); in the second round
(after having observed s1), he has the option to buy the good at price p1.
Let us represent the menu of buy options as a pair of functions, c1(v1) and p1(v1),
v1 ∈ [0,1]. In the uniform-logistic example, the expected revenue maximizing strike
10The cdf of the standard logistic distribution is Gi(si)=esi/(1 + esi), si ∈ (−∞,+∞).
20price-schedule is given by (18),
p1(v1)=1− v1.



































This (downward-sloping) schedule is depicted as the top curve in Figure 1.
If the buyer has a higher estimate then he will choose to buy an option with a lower
strike price at a higher cost. For example, if the buyer has the lowest estimate, v1 =0 ,
then he buys the option of getting the good at p1 =1 , which costs c1 =l n [ ( 1+e)/e] ≈
0.3133 upfront, and yields zero net surplus. In contrast, the highest type, v1 =1 ,b u y s
a call option with zero strike price at a cost of about 0.8133.
Now we turn to the case of many buyers, n>1, in the uniform-logistic example.
We will compute the optimal handicap auction represented by {ci,p i}n
i=1.A s i n t h e
case of n =1 , in the revenue-maximizing mechanism, pi(vi) ≡ 1 − vi.
Instead of analytically deriving ci(vi) for diﬀerent numbers of buyers, we carry out
a more practical Monte Carlo simulation. What we describe below is also the method
that a seller could use in order to determine the parameters of an optimal handicap
auction in practice.
We take 100,000 random draws from the joint distribution of (s,v−i),a n dc o m -
pute wj = vj + sj − pj(vj) for all j. Then we determine ci(0) from (20), where
the expectation is estimated by the sample mean. We compute ci(vi) recursively,
ci(vi+step)=ci(vi)+step∗c0


























p, price premium (x 100)
Figure 1: Fee schedules in the revenue maximizing handicap auction
(uniform-logistic setup; schedules from top to bottom for n=1, 2, and 5)








From ci(vi) and pi(vi) we compute Ci(pi) ≡ ci(p
−1
i (pi)).
The results of a (typical) simulation are shown in Figure 1. The top curve shows
Ci(pi) for the case of n =1 . There are actually two (almost identical) curves superim-
posed on each other: one graphs the formula that we derived before, the other is the
result of the Monte Carlo experiment. The curve in the middle is Ci(pi) for n =2 ,
and the one in the bottom is Ci(pi) for n =5 .A sn increases, Ci(pi) shifts down and
ﬂattens out.
224 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed an auction model where the seller could decide how accu-
rately the buyers learned their private valuations. In particular, in our setting, the
buyers only knew an initial estimate of their private valuation, and the seller had
the ability to release (without observing) independent signals that were added to the
buyers’ estimates to determine their ex post valuations. In other words, the buyers’
valuations were initially uncertain, but the seller could allow them to resolve this un-
certainty. We derived the expected revenue maximizing mechanism.
In the optimal mechanism, the seller allows the buyers to learn their valuations with
the highest precision and obtains the same expected revenue as if she could observe
the additional signals (which she can release, but cannot directly observe). The buyers
do not enjoy any additional information rents from the signals whose disclosure is
controlled by the seller.
The outcome of this mechanism can be implemented via a “handicap auction.” In
the ﬁrst phase of this mechanism, the seller publishes a price premium—fee schedule for
each buyer; each buyer chooses a price premium and pays the corresponding fee. Then
the seller allows the buyers to learn their valuations with the highest precision. In the
second phase, the buyers bid for the good in a second-price sealed-bid auction with a
zero reservation price, knowing that the winner will pay his premium over the price.
For a single buyer, the handicap auction simpliﬁes to a menu of buy-options.
Interestingly, our main result extends to general adverse selection models,a ss h o w n
in our related paper Es˝ o and Szentes (2002). In that paper, we consider a setup
where a principal controls the precision of the agent’s information regarding his own
type (productivity, ability, etc.), by being able to release, without observing, signals
that reﬁne the agent’s estimate.11 In the principal’s optimal contract the agent learns
his type with the highest precision, yet no information rents will be left with the
agent for the additional signals.12 Again, the one who controls the ﬂow of information
appropriates the rents of information.
11This is the case, for example, when the principal is the employer of the agent, and decides about
the extent of the agent’s learning the details of the task, etc.
12The optimal contract, however, may be a lot more complicated than the handicap auction.
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